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The U.S. Departments of Justice and Agriculture have focused attention recently 
on rising levels of corporate concentration in agricultural markets and the challenges that 
may pose to U.S. anti-trust enforcement and agricultural policies. Both agencies have 
raised particular concerns about dominant firms’ exercise of buyer power over farmers, 
especially in livestock markets controlled by a shrinking number of large multinational 
meat packers. U.S. hog markets have undergone rapid concentration in the last 25 years, 
with the top four packers now controlling two-thirds of the market and Smithfield Foods, 
the industry leader, commanding 31 percent.  
 
Despite the rapid structural changes in the U.S. hog industry, the literature on 
buyer power in hog markets is quite limited. In this paper, we review the available 
literature, which has been generally presented as demonstrating that buyer power is not a 
significant problem. We find that interpretation to be poorly justified. Researchers have 
found well-documented evidence of market power on both the seller and the buyer sides 
of the market, though the studies have been less clear on the specific causes. Mirroring 
prevailing practices in Justice Department merger reviews, researchers have often 
discounted buyer power using methodologies more appropriate to seller power, then 
dismissed findings of seller power by pointing to offsetting “efficiency gains” from 
concentration. Yet such apparent efficiency gains in seller markets can include reductions 
in the prices concentrated firms pay for animals through their exercise of buyer power. 
We also raise the question of how buyer power in concentrated retail markets may 
compound the exercise of buyer power by packers. The paper concludes with a set of 
recommendations for further research, including the refinement of methodologies for the 
study of buyer power, and an assessment of proposed new USDA regulations on packer 
buying practices. 
 





Buyer Power in U.S. Hog Markets:  
A Critical Review of the Literature 
 
By Timothy A. Wise and Sarah E. Trist 
 
Introduction 
In 2009 the Department of Justice (DOJ) and United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) announced a series of workshops to examine the effects of 
concentration of agriculture on farmers, ranchers, producers, and consumers (Federal 
Register 2009). As USDA’s Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack stated at the first 
workshop in Ankeny, Iowa,  “these are workshops that have been long overdue.” (DOJ 
USDA 2010b)  
 
U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder opened the workshop remarking, “We've 
learned the hard way that recessions and long periods of reckless deregulation can foster 
practices that are anticompetitive and even illegal.  So we have to ask, is today's 
agriculture industry suffering from a lack of free and fair competition in the marketplace? 
That's the central question.” (DOJ USDA 2010b)  
 
The workshops are designed to address a variety of concerns along the food chain, 
examining issues that are especially important to livestock agriculture: the presence of 
buyer power (monopsony), vertical integration, forward contracting, and the ownership 
of livestock by packers prior to purchase (DOJ USDA 2010b). They are addressing these 
issues through five workshops, each with its own focus, to take place around the country. 
The first workshop, held in Ankeny, Iowa focused on “issues of concern to farmers,” 
specifically, concentration in the seed market and challenges faced by hog producers. The 
second workshop held in Normal, Alabama on May 21 examined the poultry industry. 
The June 25 workshop in Madison, Wisconsin covered issues related to the dairy 
industry, while the workshop in Fort Collins, Colorado on August 27 will focus on 
livestock (hogs and cattle). The final workshop, to be held in Washington DC on 
December 8, will explore the changing margins in agriculture (Department of Justice 
2010b). 
 
There is a great deal of interest in these hearings. In response to the 
announcement of the hearings, over 15,000 comments were submitted (Department of 
Justice 2010b). On March 12 over 800 people assembled for the first of the five public 
hearings. With a focus on the seed and hog industries, farmers and state-level 
representatives discussed their concerns that concentration was contributing to the decline 
in livelihoods and communities in rural America. Some producers and seed dealers touted 
the benefits they felt they had gained from using biotech products, yet they reiterated the 
importance of having a choice in what they produced, where their inputs came from, and 
their options for marketing (DOJ USDA 2010b). Hog producers acknowledged some of 





their desire to get a fair market price for their animals and maintain some independence 
in their work.  
 
At the outset, the USDA and the DOJ were clear that these hearings would 
examine not just the effects of concentration on firms’ ability to overcharge consumers 
but also their power to underpay producers. DOJ reviews of mergers in agriculture tend 
to focus on whether a merger would have a negative impact on consumers, with 
significantly less attention to concerns regarding buyer power – the ability of a packer to 
drive down the prices it pays to farmers because the farmers lack other markets for their 
animals. 
 
Further attention to these issues has been generated by the June 2010 issuance by 
USDA’s Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA) of long-
awaited regulations governing unfair practices in livestock buying markets (Federal 
Register 2010). The proposed rules, which restrict packer use of “undue preferences” in 
purchasing and establish clearer guidelines for contract livestock production, have 
generated an outcry from packers, heated discussions in Congress, and support from 
many farm-advocacy groups (see, for example, Farm Organizations 2010). 
 
Smithfield’s 2007 acquisition of Premium Standard Farms is indicative of the 
concerns farmers express about the anti-competitive impacts of concentration. The DOJ 
gave its stamp of approval to allow the recognized industry giant to take over a company 
that was at the time the sixth largest hog packer and the second largest hog producer in 
the country.  In its final report DOJ stated, “the merged firm is not likely to harm 
competition, consumers or farmers.” (Department of Justice 2007) The Antitrust Division 
came to this conclusion despite complaints from farmers in the Eastern Seaboard that the 
merger would leave independent hog farmers in North Carolina, South Carolina, and 
Virginia with only one major buyer – Smithfield – if they could not afford to ship their 
hogs outside the region.  To find a competitive bid for their animals, farmers would have 
to ship their market-weight hogs 400 miles to the nearest major packer, well beyond the 
150 miles hog farmers ship on average to market (Buhr 2010). This is precisely the kind 
of situation that gives buyers undue leverage over sellers.  
 
“When agribusiness purchasing power is reduced to a small number of 
companies, does that create such an unlevel playing field that it compels those in the 
middle to either get bigger or get out?” asked U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack 
at the start of the first DOJ/USDA hearing (DOJ USDA 2010b). 
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a thorough review of the current literature 
on the hog industry to assess the evidence that concentrated ownership of production and 
packing has resulted in the exercise of buyer power by pork packers. Hog markets have 
not been studied as thoroughly as other livestock sectors.  A 2009 Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) report on concentration in agricultural markets concluded 
that for hogs there was little cause for concern about anti-competitive practices (GAO 





ignored significant evidence of both in the literature on hog markets, and overlooked key 
studies that suggest ample cause for concern. 
 
The paper is divided into five parts. Section 1 provides background describing the 
major changes in the pork industry over the last thirty years and presents the reasons 
concentration is a cause for concern. Section 2 discusses issues faced by producers when 
packers have buyer power. Section 3 reviews the current literature on buyer power in the 
hog industry and discusses deficiencies in the literature and the reading of it. Section 4 
considers the interaction of concentration in food retail and buyer power in the hog 
market, and section 5 provides policy implications and conclusions we can draw from 
this review.  This includes an examination of the recently proposed rule from GIPSA, 
which has the expressed goal of addressing some of these issues. 
 
 
1. Changing Structure in U.S. Hog Production 
 
The pork industry has seen dramatic changes over the last thirty years in both 
packing and production. Concentration in packing has been accompanied by increased 
packer ownership of livestock (for more background, see Starmer and Wise 2007). 
 
The U.S. pork packing industry has moved to rely on larger plants that take 
advantage of economies of scale. As larger plants have been built, companies relying on 
smaller plants have gone bankrupt or been acquired by larger packing companies.  In 
1976, only 12 plants slaughtered more than one million hogs and hogs slaughtered by 
those large plants accounted for 27 percent of the U.S. supply. By 1998 the larger plants 
slaughtering over one million hogs had increased to 30, and by 2006, nearly 95 percent of 











































Commonly Used Measures of Concentration 
 
Concentration Ratio Is commonly used by economists to describe the level of concentration in a market. The 
concentration ratio is the market share of the top 4, 8, or 20 firms in an industry by sales. Often used to examine the 
market share of the top four firms, it is commonly referred to as the CR4. The concentration ratio as a measure of 
concentration is comparable over time and across industries, but is not recognized on its own as evidence of an 
adverse impact of concentration (Greer 1980; Baumol and Blinder 2006). When reviewing potential mergers, the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) examines an industry’s current concentration ratio and predicts how this might 
change if the merger took place. (Federal Trade Commission 2010) Generally, when a four-firm ratio reaches 20 
percent a market is considered concentrated, 40 percent highly concentrated, and when the ratio reaches 60 percent it 
is considered likely that firms exercise market power. Currently, the CR4 for hog packing is 66 percent (Hendrickson 
and Heffernan 2007). 
 
HHI: The Herfindalh-Hirshman Index This widely accepted measure of market concentration is calculated by taking 
the square of each firm’s market share in a market and summing the results. It is a measure of the relative size and 
distribution of firms in the market. When the index approaches zero, the market is made up mostly of a larger 
number of firms equal in size. A perfectly monopoly (or monopsony) would have an HHI of 10,000.  
Both the FTC and DOJ examine the change in an industry’s HHI at the time of a proposed merger,. They 
consider markets with an HHI below 1,000 to be unconcentrated, those with an HHI between 1,000 and 1,800 to be 
moderately concentrated, and those above 1,800 to be highly concentrated. When considering a merger in a 
moderately concentrated market, the DOJ guidelines require review if the post merger increase in the HHI is 
predicted to be 100 points or greater. When considering a merger in a highly concentrated market this review is 
triggered when the increase is predicted to be 50 points or higher (Department of Justice 2010a; Federal Trade 
Commission 2010). Taylor (2002) points out serious flaws in the methodology underlying the HHI, noting that the 
measure underestimates market power because it does not account for alliances, partial ownership and other means 
of control. 
Last measured in 2006, the HHI for the hog market was about 1,200. Obtaining all the information necessary 
to calculate this measure is one of the greatest challenges to its use, because many of these firms are privately held 
and market information is not readily available (Paarlberg 2010).  With Smithfield’s acquisitions in recent years 
pushing its market share to 31 percent, the HHI in 2010 just for the top four firms would be 1,445 (see Table 5 
below). 
 
HHI & Symmetric Firms:  In 1999 Paarlburg and 
colleagues used the HHI to examine concentration in 
another way. Following Helpman and Krugman (1985), 
they took the inverse of the HHI to estimate how many 
equal-sized firms would make up such a market 
(Symmetric Firms = 10,000 x 1/HHI). In 1985, they 
calculated that the hog market behaved as if there were 
22 symmetric firms. In 1997, market concentration had 
reduced the number of symmetric firms to ten. The 
authors came to the conclusion that in the hog market, 
any fewer than eight to ten symmetric firms would be 
cause for concern about anti-competitive practices  
(Paarlberg, Boehlje et al. 1999). Hog packing has gotten considerably more concentrated since 1999. The HHI for 
the top four firms, listed above, would yield a Symmetric Firm estimate of fewer than seven. 
 
Lerner Index: The index is the price minus the marginal cost of production over price. Under perfect competition 
there would be no difference between price and the marginal cost. The Lerner Index is a conventional measure of 
monopoly or monopsony price distortion, essentially a measure of the ability of a firm to charge selling prices 
beyond marginal costs. A major challenge in using this index in agriculture is discovering the actual conduct of a 
firm, since much of the pricing and cost data is proprietary.  
 
For a more complete discussion of the way economists measure and consider concentration see 
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In 1982, the top four hog packing firms (CR4) controlled 36 percent of the 
market. (See text box on common measures of concentration.) By 2006, their share had 
risen to 62 percent.  Since then, with the merger of Smithfield Foods with Premium 
Standard Farms in 2007, the CR4 has risen to 67 percent (see Table 1) (GAO 2009; 
Smithfield Foods 2010). 
 
In addition to packing pork, the top four pork packers are also involved in other 
areas of agribusiness. Tyson entered pork production through the purchase of a 
production facility in North Carolina in 1977 and that year became the nation’s top hog 
producer, though not the top packer. It entered poultry processing in 1986 and by 2001 it 
was the largest processor and marketer of chicken and red meat with its purchase of IBP, 
Inc. (Tyson 2009). Similarly, Swift was purchased by JBS, a Brazilian packing company 
in 2007. JBS also moved into poultry, purchasing a major stake in Pilgrim’s Pride when it 
emerged from bankruptcy. The Brazilian company now dominates beef packing in South 
America, the United States, and Europe (Swift & Co 2005; Chasan and Burgdorfer 2009; 
Johnson 2009). Cargill, long known for its processing of grains, entered the pork business 
in 1987 with the purchase of a plant from Oscar Mayer Foods and the lease of a 
processing plant from Hormel.  Growing over time, it acquired one of Tyson’s pork 
packing divisions in 1995 (Cargill 2010). 
 
Taking a closer look at the largest pork packer and producer, Smithfield Foods 
controls 31 percent of hog packing and 20 percent of production. (Duke University 2004; 
Smithfield Foods 2010). Starting in the late 1980s, the company rapidly underwent both 
horizontal and vertical mergers that allowed it to swallow some of the other giants it 
competed with, including Carroll Farms in 1990, Murphy Farms in 1994, Farmland 
Foods in 2003 and Premium Standard Farms in 2007 (Smithfield 2009). 
 
While Smithfield took over other packers, it also vertically integrated. The 
company moved to control the entire farm-to-table supply chain, from production, 
packing, and processing to branding a final retail product. Additionally, they expanded 
their scope to develop and own the very genetics of the hogs they pack (Smithfield 2009). 
 
Changes in the U.S. packing industry, well documented by Azzam (1998) and 
McDonald (2000), were accompanied by and helped drive changes in hog production. 
Over the last 30 years, fewer farms produced more hogs, with the number of hog farms 
dropping significantly from 346,090 in 1986 to 75,350 in 2002 – a decline of more than 
78 percent (Mattera 2003). In 2002, nearly half the U.S. hog inventory was held by 
operations with more than 5,000 head (Meyer 2006). In 2007, the USDA Economic 
Research Service found that the largest 110 hog farms, with more than 50,000 hogs each, 
held over 54 percent of the entire U.S. hog inventory (Key and McBride 2007). 
 
Farms grew in size and also moved between regions. In the 1990s, production 
shifted from the Midwest to the Eastern Seaboard, largely due to large facilities such as 
Smithfield’s Tar Heel Plant in North Carolina, the largest packing house in the world, 
which opened in 1994 (Smithfield 2009). The mega-plant, which slaughters more than 8 





contract production in this region (Duke University 2004). While feed was more 
expensive to ship from the Corn Belt, the warmer weather and tight supply chain created 
by contracts offered new efficiencies that favored production in the Eastern Seaboard. 
This shift halted in 1997 when North Carolina put a moratorium on the construction of 
new operations with over 250 hogs.  Interviews with industry leaders suggested that hog 
production, a major source of pollution resulting from hog manure, is now moving to the 
arid West as a response to lax environmental regulation in that region (McBride and Key 
2003; Duke University 2004). As of 2005, 62 percent of hog production occurred in Corn 
Belt States, 15 percent in North Carolina, and 7 percent in Western States (Key and 




Similar to trends in the poultry industry, contract production of hogs is now 
occurring all over the United States.  Instead of producers marketing hogs at hog buying 
stations or auction barns, packers may own the hogs from farrow-to-finish with producers 
contracted for the labor and fixed infrastructure needed for production. Alternately, 
producers who own their own hogs may enter into advanced marketing agreements that 
guarantee the sale of their hogs based on a formula for price that may include variables 
such as weight, quality, and the day’s spot market price.  
 
USDA reports significant improvements in productivity with the increases in 
scale and in the use of production contracts, though there is evidence that scale 
efficiencies may stop when plants reach a capacity of 2,000 head (McBride and Key 
2003). Between 1992 and 2004, total factor productivity rose over six percent per year, 
and real production costs declined 4.7 percent per year. The same study reports a 30 
percent reduction in the price of hogs at the farm gate (Key and McBride 2007). 
 
 
2. Buyer Power on the Farm  
 
Before examining the evidence that hog markets are concentrated to the point that 
buyers have and exercise power over farmers, it is important to understand the many 
ways in which buyer power can decrease competition. As a farmer at the first DOJ 





can maintain some level of freedom in terms of his/her decisions about what to produce, 
under what conditions, whom to sell it to, and at a fair price (DOJ USDA 2010b).  
 
Buyer power is known as monopsony or oligopsony, distinct from monopoly and 
oligopoly, which generally refer to the ways in which market concentration gives 
dominant firms the ability to manipulate the prices they charge for their products. Under 
monopsony conditions, market concentration has reduced the number of potential buyers 
of a product to the point that the seller is forced to accept the buyer’s terms for the sale. 
In a well functioning market,  price is generally determined by both supply and demand, 
therefore market power requires that the buyer have control of one or both of these 
functions (Greer 1980; Zheng and Vukina 2009). Buyer power can affect not only the 
price producers receive for their products but also the conditions under which they 
produce, the quality of the contracts they receive for production or marketing, and the 
distribution of risk between the buyer and the seller.  
 
Farmers are particularly vulnerable to buyer power because many are selling 
perishable goods (e.g. live animals) or products that would require large storage capacity 
(e.g. several tons of corn).  For hog farmers, this can be particularly problematic because 
they operate on very tight margins, rely on selling their animals at optimum weight, and 
need to bring in the next litter on a fixed schedule. Having just one buyer, or even just 
two or three, can allow the buyer to take advantage of the farmer’s need to sell. Hog 
farmers also have limited options for shipping their animals to a distant buyer who might 
offer a more competitive price. Shipping live animals long distances is expensive, causes 
high levels of mortality, and can reduce the quantity (“shrinkage”) and quality of the 
meat (Buhr 2010). 
 
The most egregious form of buyer power occurs when a single buyer offers a 
take-it-or-leave-it price to a farmer.  But buyers can exercise market power in other ways 
as well. Packers are known to offer lower prices to farmers who do not deliver a fully 
loaded trailer of hogs, a form of “undue preference” based on volume (Perry 2010).  
 
  There are documented reports of packers paying lower prices even when smaller-
scale farmers team up to deliver a fully loaded trailer of animals, a form of discrimination 
based on the buyer’s preference to deal with only a few large suppliers (Federal Register 
2010). Because many packers’ disassembly lines are highly automated to cut perfectly 
uniform animals, buyers can also offer lower prices for hogs that do not meet standards of 
uniformity, or refuse to buy them altogether (Martinez and Zering 2004). With only one 
buyer, farmers can see the value of their animals driven below production costs.  
 
Another well-documented form of buyer power derives from so-called captive 
supply, when a packer also owns large volumes of livestock or controls livestock through 
contracting. Smithfield, the largest hog producer and also the largest contractor, held 
800,000 sows in 2004. In 2005, GIPSA estimated that packers owned 20-30 percent of 
the U.S. hog inventory (Key and McBride 2007). This can eliminate effective price 
discovery, as the firm’s price for that livestock is internal to the firm. The packer can also 





favorable to the firm. It is common for independent hog farmers to find their few 
potential buyers telling them they do not need more animals when farmers need to sell. 
As farmer Larry Schroder testified at the DOJ/USDA hearing in March, “When they have 
90 to 95 percent of their supply lined up, why would they ever bid hard for that last 5 
percent? They would rather let those slots stay empty rather than increase the price on the rest 
of the 95 [percent].” (DOJ USDA 2010a) 
 
Finally, there is the related problem of packer-controlled production (through 
direct ownership or contracts) reducing the share of animals traded on the open market, 
the so-called spot market that traditionally takes place at auction houses. The decline in 
spot market sales raises concerns about true price discovery and the potential for large 
buyers to manipulate markets through spot market purchases (Zheng and Vukina 2009).  
As Figure 1 shows, the share of hogs sold on the spot market has declined from 62% in 
1994 to just 8% in 2009 (American Antitrust Institute 2008; Grimes and Plain 2009; 
Grimes, Plain et al. January 2004). When the spot market is thinned to this level, 
concerns grow about whether the prices offered represent fair market prices. In part, this 
is because large buyers can exert undue influence on prices with their purchases, and they 
have an interest in doing so because the spot price plays a significant role in determining 
the prices buyers pay to growers under contract. The smaller the volume of sales on the 
spot market, the easier it is for buyers to time their purchases to hold down prices. 
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Prices are reported to the Agriculture Market Service of the USDA three times a 
day, with the mid-morning price reported at 9:30 am CST and again at 1:30 pm CST. The 
rest of the day’s sales are reported at 8 am the following day. Prices are reported by 
region and for the entire nation. These published prices signal to others in the market the 
supply and demand of hogs that day (Grimes, Plain et al. March 2004). Buyers can hold 
their bids until just after these times to drive down the reported market price. 
 
As hog farmer Chuck Wirtz testified at the March DOJ/USDA hearing, “If they're 
going to … buy something from you in the afternoon, they'll come at 1:31 because 1:30 is 
the cutoff for the afternoon report….. So when they need pigs, they know how to buy 
them so as not to influence the cost of all their pigs." (DOJ USDA 2010a) 
 
Of course, all of these market pressures on independent hog farmers have led 
many of them to give up their independence by entering production or marketing 
contracts with one of the few large packers in their area. Farmers testified that they were 
now finding it difficult to get bank financing unless they had a contract with a packer in 
hand (DOJ USDA 2010b). The rise of contract production in hogs is recent and rapid, 
with an estimated 90 percent of U.S hog production now under some form of contract, 
direct ownership, or advance marketing arrangement (See Figure 2, Grimes and Plain 







































Contract Hog Production 
 
Contracts in the hog market take two forms: production contracts and advanced 
marketing agreements. Similar to arrangements that dominate the poultry industry, 
production contracts are agreements between farmers, also known as growers, and their 
contractors. Under these agreements contractors retain ownership of hogs.  Growers build 
facilities, often to contractors’ specifications, and receive all inputs from contractors: 
feeder pigs, feed, transport, veterinary services, and many supplies. Packers may provide 
technical advice, dictate management techniques, and monitor the compliance of the 
grower. In return, the grower receives a fee for service, in an economic relationship some 
have likened more to wage labor (Hendrickson, Heffernan et al. 2008). These contracts 
covered only five percent of production in 1992, but grew to include 28 percent of 
operations and 67 percent of hog inventory in the United States by 2004 (Key and 
McBride 2007). 
 
Advanced marketing agreements (AMAs) specify terms of a future sale. The 
producer retains ownership of the hogs and is responsible for more management 
decisions, although some contracts will specify standards for management. Details of the 
contract will dictate the quantity of hogs delivered, their quality, the location and timing 
of delivery, and a formula for payment. This formula to calculate payment is often tied to 
the thin spot market and based on the packer’s quality assessment. A farmer may hold a 
production contract, an advanced marketing contract, or both. In 2004, nearly 90 percent 
of hogs were sold and or produced through one or more forms of contract (Key and 
McBride 2007). 
 
Contracts present a number of opportunities for packers to exercise buyer power.  
The first is the power imbalance between the contracting parties. Packers have a large 
number of farmers to choose from, while many farmers have just one or two packers 
offering them contracts.  Under such conditions, farmers often have to accept the contract 
terms the packer is offering, particularly if the same packer is the only buyer on the local 
or regional spot market.  As poultry farmer Mickey Block testified to the DOJ hearing in 
May 2010, “The lack of competition of given geographic regions has led to the 
integrators with all of the power, this leaves the grower with little or no choice. The 
rower is given a contract, it’s one sided, it’s a take it or leave it situation. Companies 




Second, contracts significantly limit transparency in the market.  Strict 
confidentiality clauses in contracts prevent growers from sharing the terms and 
conditions of contracts with other producers. The packer, of course, knows the terms of 
all the contracts it is signing, leaving farmers at a disadvantage (McBride and Key 2003). 
 
Third, contract enforcement is difficult. Farmers justifiably fear retaliation by 
packers if they bring suit for breaches of the contract, because they know they have few 
buyers and they can’t afford to alienate one. This leaves packers with an unfair advantage 
in complying with the terms of contracts. In fact, there is evidence that a producer who 





the area may collude to blacklist the farmer (DOJ USDA 2010a). 
 
Fourth, widespread contract production creates potential barriers to entry for new 
producers. As noted earlier, contracts can become a requirement for bank financing, and 
larger financing is needed because of packer preferences for large-scale, capital-intensive 
production. Generally, the terms of the contract do not guarantee income for the useful 
life of the equipment needed to produce hogs. Producers may gain the security of a 
guaranteed buyer for the animals on their farms, but that security does not extend for the 
life of their investments, nor their debt obligations.  This leaves producers under 
additional pressure to accept the contract terms dictated by the packer when it comes time 
to renew the contract. As one poultry producer testified, “When you have that kind of 
debt load over you, of course, you’re going to choose to sign the contract. You feel that 
there’s no other option when you owe … a half a million or a million dollars” (DOJ 
USDA 2010a). Producers also take on the liabilities associated with environmental 
compliance, which contracts generally assign to the farmer (Hendrickson, Heffernan et al. 
2008). 
 
Finally, contracts can create barriers to entry for competing packers. The ease of 
entry and exit into an industry is often part of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and 
DOJ analysis when reviewing potential mergers, because it is one of the signs of a well-
functioning market. The higher the barriers to entry into a market, the more power those 
already in the business have (MacDonald 2006; Department of Justice 2010a; Federal 
Trade Commission 2010). Packers hoping to enter a new market need a large plant that 
they can run at capacity, which requires access to many more hogs than they may find on 
the spot market. With most local hog production tied up in multi-year contracts, new 
market entrants can have a more difficult time competing with those already in the 
market. A dominant packer can also shut out competition by buying up competitors and 
shuttering their operations. Some have theorized that packers may have even agreed 
amongst themselves to compete in different regions. Since the merger of Smithfield and 
PSF, Smithfield has remained the only major packer on the Eastern Seaboard despite the 
presence of millions of hogs in that region (Carstensen 2008b). Why is no other packer 
competing with Smithfield for that market?  
 
 
3. Review of the Literature 
 
In contrast to the relatively well-documented research on buyer power in beef and 
poultry markets, agricultural economists have built a significantly smaller literature on 
the hog industry. In 2009, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) published a 
study on concentration in agriculture markets with the stated goal of reviewing “trends in 
concentration, expenditures, and commodity and food prices” from evidence in peer-
reviewed literature, government, and industry sources (GAO 2009). The GAO report, 
which included a review of just six academic publications on hog markets, has come to 
serve as the benchmark for DOJ’s reviews of the impacts of mergers and acquisitions on 
competition. While the GAO detailed the dramatic rise in market concentration and the 





more on seller power and concluded that buyer power is not a concern in the hog 
industry:  
 
  “The empirical economic literature has not established that 
concentration in the processing segment of the beef, pork, or dairy 
sectors or the retail sector overall has adversely affected commodity or 
food prices. Most of the studies that we reviewed either found no 
evidence of market power or found efficiency effects that were larger 
than the market power effects of concentration. While a few studies 
found some evidence of market power, it is unclear whether this market 
power was caused by concentration or some other factor.” (GAO 2009, 
p. 3) 
 
In this section, we examine the GAO’s review of the literature on market power in 
hogs.  As we show, the GAO not only mischaracterized the few studies it included in its 
review, it omitted important studies using data more relevant to current levels of 
concentration. This closer examination of the evidence of buyer power in hog markets 
suggests that there is cause for concern. 
 
Most studies rely on econometric modeling, which allows researchers to model 
the impact of several variables that might influence market power. Various types of 
models have been used to examine the presence of buyer power. Establishing a causal 
link between the presence of buyer power and concentration or contracts is a challenging 
problem for researchers given the limited and imperfect data available to them (Zheng 
and Vukina 2009). 
 
The GAO study included six peer-reviewed studies published between 1990 and 
2009 based on data collected between 1972 and 2007. Three of the studies focused 
exclusively on oligopoly power and its effects on uncompetitive pricing faced by the 
consumer. Overall, they found that to the extent concentration allowed packers to 
increase selling prices, those higher prices were more than offset by the efficiency gains 
from concentration. Reed and Clark of the USDA Economic Research Service examined 
the markets of seven different agricultural products. In their paper they make different 
assumptions about how markets work and with their methods find no evidence of buyer 
power in the hog market. They acknowledge that an increase in the price spread is in fact 
occurring between the farm gate and retail, however they attribute the increase to 
changing consumer demand, innovation, and efficiencies gained by concentration (Reed 
and Clark 2000). Similarly, Morrison Paul attributes the changes in market structure and 
pricing to cost efficiencies gained by increasingly large packing plants and tight supply 
chains (Morrison Paul 1999). 
 
A third study reviewed by the GAO, based on a non-random group of North 
Carolina producers under contract to one packer, found no statistically significant buyer 
power in the market (Inoue and Vukina 2006). The authors caution readers that the 
sample they analyzed was not random and cannot be generalized to the hog market in 





support for its conclusion that there was no buyer power in hog markets.  
 
This is particularly striking because the three remaining studies reviewed by the 
GAO found evidence of buyer power.  Zheng and Vukina (2009) use an econometric 
model for the national market using mandatory price reporting data from 2001 through 
2007.  They were looking specifically for evidence that buyer power resulted from the 
increased utilization of advanced marketing agreements (AMAs). They report clear 
evidence of buyer power, but their analysis failed to prove that this was caused by 
AMAs. This was apparently the reason the GAO dismissed the findings as irrelevant to 
concentration, but the authors could hardly have been clearer in their conclusion. They 
state that there was “a statistically significant presence of market power in the 
procurement of live hogs on the spot market. However, the source of that market power 
cannot be narrowed down to the industry’s advanced marketing agreement (AMA) but is 
likely to be related to classical oligopsony (concentration) issues.” They further state, 
“The problem seems to be coming from the ever-increasing industry concentration and 
not from the increasing use of AMAs” (Zheng and Vukina 2009, p. 262). 
 
In another study reviewed by the GAO, Schroeter and Azzam (1990) examine the 
market in a way that takes into account the relationship between different meat markets. 
A packer with enough power in either market, or some in both, may have incentive to 
manipulate either market to clear both products at a favorable price. Schroeter and Azzam 
examine the beef and pork industries, creating a model that tests the possibility that a 
packer may exert buyer power in both the inputs of their industry (live animals) and the 
market power in selling the outputs (meat). Using data collected between 1976 and 1986, 
they find that “the evidence suggests that 55 percent and 47 percent of the farm-to-retail 
price margins for beef and pork, respectively, can be attributed to market power in the 
meat industry.” (Schroeter and Azzam 1990, p. 1373) Interestingly, the authors note the 
importance of looking at packer concentration in regional, not national markets. (More on 
that later.) 
 
The GAO reviewed a second paper by Schroeter and Azzam that did just that, 
with interesting but less definitive findings.  Using weekly data from 1972-1998 from the 
National Provisioners’ reported price quotes, the authors assume that producers sell hogs 
in regional markets rather than one national market. They find statistically significant 
evidence of buyer power in the early period of the study, showing that “oligopsony 
distortions are significantly positive at the 5 percent level in seventeen of the sample's 
eighteen initial quarters.” (Schroeter and Azzam 1991, p. 996) But they find the effect 
diminished as the period went on, and they offer a caution about their methodology 
related to their assumptions about packer behavior when prices are low.  
 
From the GAO’s small sample of papers, it is difficult to support the conclusion 
that buyer power is not a concern in hog markets. Additional studies omitted from the 
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Beyond the Literature Reviewed by the GAO  
 
As noted earlier, the literature on market power in the hog industry is limited, 
which we confirmed with our own literature review.
1  Azzam, Pagoulatos, and Schroeter 
(1988) offer some historical perspective, finding non-competitive prices for live hogs 
from 1972 through mid-1979 followed by a return to competitive pricing in 1986. 
Sperling (2002), in a study of live hog prices in Iowa and southern Minnesota from 1988 
through 2000, found no statistically significant evidence that processing firms engaged in 
anticompetitive behavior. 
 
Most important, though, the GAO omitted from its review the most 
comprehensive research report, and one of only four that relies on data after 2000. 
Ironically, the report was commissioned by the government’s own Grain Inspection, 
Packers and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA) in 2003. GIPSA contracted North 
Carolina-based RTI International to conduct a multi-million dollar study on the 
marketing practices of the livestock industry, including all the steps along the food 
system. Researchers examined the practices of farmers, ranchers, retailers, and exporters. 
Published in 2007, the RTI study presents compelling evidence of buyer power in hog 
markets (RTI International 2007a). 
 
With a volume of the study devoted entirely to the hog industry, researchers 
collected confidential data directly from packers. This data, not available to the public 
due to confidentiality agreements, was published in the report only in summary form. 
RTI complimented this with Mandatory Price Reporting data to examine the spot market 
from October 2002 through March 2005. One of their goals was to determine if the 
spread of AMAs had thinned the spot market to the point that packers could manipulate 
prices. 
 
RTI found clear evidence of market power but was unable statistically to 
determine if the cause was the increase in AMAs. But RTI’s findings are directly relevant 
to the question of market concentration and buyer power in hog markets. RTI found that 
prices packers paid for hogs, based on live weight, varied by as much as 40 percent, a 
large variation that remained even when researchers controlled for transportation, quality, 
and regional differences (RTI International 2007b). Variability of this magnitude is often 
a sign that a market is not functioning competitively, suggesting that buyers and sellers 
are not both working with adequate information to allow supply and demand to settle 
around one price. This situation may be the result of buyer power.  
 
und clear evidence that packer control of live animals, 
ct ownership, depressed spot market prices. They state, 
 
1 This review of the literature was completed in March 2010 using Econolit, LexisNexis, and Tufts 
University Library’s MultiDabase Search. Search terms included “hog production,” “pork production,” 
“Smithfield,” “marketing hogs,” “marketing pork,” and “monopsony livestock”. Only articles specific to 
he U.S. hog market analyzing data after 1985 were reviewed. Commonly cited articles found in the 
iterature resulting from this search were also reviewed. 
t
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“An increase in either contract or packer-owned hog sales decreases the spot price for 
hogs.” (RTI International 2007b, p. ES-3). For every one percent increase in contract hog 
quantities used by packers, the spot price paid to producers dropped by 0.88 percent. 
Every one percent increase in the proportion of packer-owned hogs in a given plant 
reduced the price paid to producers on the spot market by 0.28 percent. Given the tight 
margins producers manage today, these are significant price impacts that can mean the 
difference between profitability and insolvency. RTI further showed that packers that 
used a combination of contracts, other marketing arrangements, and spot markets paid 
lower prices to farmers than packers that relied exclusively on the spot market (RTI 
International 2007b). This certainly raises questions about whether contracts and 
marketing arrangements facilitate buyer power. 
 
Certainly any review of the evidence on buyer power in hog markets needs to go 
beyond the GAO study, and it should begin with a close examination of RTI’s findings. 
New research is needed that focuses on hog farmers’ economic gains and losses within 
this rapidly integrating industry. A good model is Domina and Taylor’s (2009) recent 
study of Alabama contract poultry farmers. Using detailed farm-level data, they found 
that poultry farmers saw net negative returns to labor (assuming a $7 hourly cost of labor) 
in ten of the fifteen years from 1995-2009, with losses totaling $182,000. They attribute a 
significant portion of these losses to integrator demands for capital improvements and 
producers’ declining bargaining power as they sought to pay off large loans for such 
investments. They note that these findings are in line with the USDA’s own surveys, 
which show producers suffering real losses of 1.2 percent per year during the same period 
(Domina and Taylor 2009). 
 
Other Important Issues for Consideration 
 
As the studies reviewed above indicate, two methodological considerations are 
important in determining whether economists find evidence of buyer power.  One derives 
from the confusion between buyer and seller power and the tendency by DOJ and many 
agricultural economists to focus more on packers’ ability to collude on selling prices.  As 
we have shown, many of those studies find evidence of market power but they dismiss its 
impacts because they often find that the efficiency gains from concentration outweigh the 
losses from the exercise of seller power. The net impact on consumer prices may indeed 
be favorable in the short run, but this in no way disproves the existence of seller power.  
In fact, many economists assume some level of oligopoly price-setting power in 
concentrated markets.  
 
  More important, though, such studies say nothing about packers’ ability to offer 
unfair prices to farmers. Most obviously, a packer could lack the market power as a seller 
to manipulate prices but could still have the buyer power to drive down producer prices. 
Smithfield, for example, might not be able to raise the prices it charges Walmart for its 
pork, but it may still wield the power to squeeze the prices it pays for North Carolina 
hogs. 
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Perhaps more to the methodological point, the very “efficiency gains” that offset 
packers’ market power as sellers can derive from those same packers’ power as buyers to 
depress the prices they pay for animals. In such cases, studies that justify further 
concentration through mergers on the basis of net efficiency gains may well be indicators 
that uncompetitive practices exist in the prices paid to producers. As Taylor pointed out 
in an exploration of so-called “all-or-nothing supply markets”: 
 
A monopsonist’s exploitation of the competitive industry’s all-or-nothing supply 
is shown to lead to a competitive allocation of resources; however, the 
monopsonist expropriates producers’ surplus in the competitive supply industry. 
To the extent that the competitive market allocation of resources and income is 
used as a standard for social welfare, as in some antitrust law, the exploitation of 
the all-or-nothing supply by the monopsonist results in an efficient allocation of 
resources, but the allocation of income is unfair (Taylor 2003, p. 2). 
 
Market efficiency should not be reduced to a question of the lowest possible 
price.
2 Gains related to scale, technology or management practices are true efficiencies, 
but lower producer prices due to the lack of competition can appear as efficiencies as 
well. An uncompetitive market is not an efficient market (Taylor 2007). 
 
This distinction between seller and buyer power has led some to argue that 
different standards and measures are needed for each. Simply put, if only one measure of 
power is examined, conclusions will not necessarily be valid for other parts of the 
production chain (Carstensen 2008a; Domina and Taylor 2009). There is certainly no 
reason to assume that market power for buyers and sellers will mirror one another 
(Carstensen 2008a). 
 
Unfortunately, while buyer power and monopoly work differently, the tools used 
to measure them are the same. Domina and Taylor point out that the GAO report lists a 
CR4 of 57 percent in broiler production and an HHI of 1,200, suggesting high levels of 
concentration but perhaps not enough to allow seller power in wholesale markets. These 
same standards “are absolutely inappropriate for analyzing buyer power of the poultry 
companies (known as integrators). The integrators have nearly absolute control of their 
respective growers” (Domina and Taylor 2009, p. 6). They argue that the thresholds for 
anticompetitive concentration should be lower in buyer markets, suggesting that the HHI 
threshold for concern of 1,600 is too high and that the elasticity in the Lerner Index is 
inappropriate for agriculture (Domina and Taylor 2009).  
 
This relates directly to the second important methodological consideration, the 
assumption that the hog market is one national market rather than many regional markets. 
Undoubtedly, the seller market for pork is a national (or international) market in which 





 It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the ways in which strict definitions of efficiency may 





reason to question whether packers’ buying markets are national in scope.  The “nearly 
absolute control” of integrators over producers that Domina and Taylor referred to above 
derives from the limited number of buyers available to local producers for the sale of 
perishable goods. 
 
Still, there is research backing the claim of one national market for hogs. GIPSA 
conducted a study in 1996 on concentration in the red-meat packing industry. The study, 
made up of several ‘projects’ or research questions, looked at hog procurement in the 
Eastern Corn Belt. Using confidential, plant-level data collected by the agency along with 
public information collected by the Agricultural Marketing Service, researchers found 
little price variation between regions, accounting for transportation costs. They found 
evidence, in fact, that packers absorbed some of producers’ transportation costs. They 
concluded that their findings “were consistent with the existence of a single national 
market for pricing of slaughter hogs” (GIPSA 1996).  
 
Heyer and Hill (2008) studied mergers approved by the DOJ in 2007 and 2008, 
including the DOJ-approved Smithfield-PSF merger. They conclude that the merger did 
not, in fact, leave North Carolina producers with one buyer, because independent hog 
sellers had access to a national market. Area hog producers had pointed out that the next 
closest potential buyer was some 400 miles away. Transporting live hogs is expensive, 
with a load of 200 hogs averaging $1.50/head per 100 miles shipped. Long shipments of 
live animals can also compromise the quality of the product (Stender 2010). 
 
A great deal rests on the assumption of a national hog market. And it changes how 
the indices and other measures common to the study of concentration and 
competitiveness look (Greer 1980). Schroeter and Azzam (1990), in the study reviewed 
by GAO, raised the issue of regional markets. Earlier, Ward had shown that of the ten 
leading hog slaughtering states, nine of them had a state-level CR4 of over 72 percent and 
seven had a CR4 of 98 percent or higher (Ward 1988). Given the dramatic concentration 
that has occurred in hog packing since 1985, regional concentration calculations would 
be even higher today. For example, in 1985 the HHI for the national market was around 
1200, but it would be over 8000 if one looked at the Eastern Seaboard Region as its own 
market. Which presents a more accurate picture of the concentration among buyers that 
farmers face in the marketplace? (See Taylor 2007 for a discussion of HHI and captive 
supply.) 
 
A related methodological issue is whether it still makes sense to define distinct 
markets for each type of meat, since vertical integration is the new standard and most 
large packers are involved in the slaughter of a variety of ‘proteins’ that can substitute for 
one another (Schroeter and Azzam 1990; Azzam 1998). This is certainly true in pork: the 
top four pork packers also currently pack poultry and beef products (Hendrickson and 
Heffernan 2007). 
 
These methodological issues need further study. 





4. Clean-up on Aisle Three: Retail Compounds Buyer Power 
 
The last USDA/DOJ hearing this year will look at the impact of concentration on 
the consumer. A workshop dedicated to margins will likely include the role of food retail, 
another area in the food chain where it is suspected that concentration has led to an 
uncompetitive market situation. Like pork production and packing, food retail has 
undergone concentration in the last 20 years with multinational retailers taking increasing 
large shares of not just the U.S. but international retail markets. Between 1982 and 2005 
the share of sales by the four largest grocery retailers doubled. (Hendrickson and 
Heffernan 2007; GAO 2009; Martinez and Kaufman 2008) The CR4 was a moderate 19 
percent in 1997 rising steadily to 30 percent in 2002. By 2009 it had reached 51 percent. 





Rising concentration in retail is cause for particular concern when it comes to 
packer buyer power. Increasingly large food retailers prefer to deal with few large 
suppliers, an advantage for large packers such as Smithfield. Large retailers and 
wholesalers drive a hard bargain with packers, which yield to this pressure in order to 
gain large orders from these major firms, especially if they are trying to market a branded 
product that requires high visibility in national retail outlets. In response to this price 
squeeze from retailers, packers with monopsony buying power can pass the tighter 
margin on to producers. Farmers ultimately bear the brunt of this compounded buyer 
power in the retail and wholesale sectors. 
 
Empirically, there is evidence that rising grocery concentration was accompanied 
by an increase in the gap between farm gate and consumer prices. In 2004 Marsh and 
Brester examined wholesale and farm gate livestock prices for beef and pork and found 
that the difference between the price paid farmers and the prices faced by consumers 
increased by 149 percent between 1970 and 1998. Less of the food dollar spent at the 





retailers and wholesalers. Marsh’s model did not allow him to explain the cause of these 
changes in margins, yet he offers two potential explanations. The first is that intense 
concentration in retail allows for collusion between firms. An alternative hypothesis is 
that concentration allows for intense negotiation with suppliers, and with it efficiency of 
scale (Marsh and Brester 1999; Marsh and Brester 2004). Either of these mechanisms 
allows the retailers and wholesalers to control a share of demand that gives them buyer 
power over producers.  
Table 4. 
 
The Economic Research Service of the USDA has also been tracking the share of 
the retail dollar farmers take home. They too report that the price spread between farm 
gate and retail is growing. The farm share of retail pork sales was above 50 percent 
through the mid-1980s, but declined significantly since then. It now ranges between 20 
and 40 percent depending on the year (USDA-ERS 2010, see Figure 3). 
 






















This examination of the issues related to concentration in the hog packing sector 
and evidence of resulting buyer power suggests that the topic requires additional 
research, with a review of the methodologies used to determine the presence of buyer 
power. The literature is scarce and some of it has been misinterpreted, by government 
researchers among others. Other literature, such as the important study by RTI, has been 
ignored. Some of the literature shows clear indications of buyer power in hog packing. 
While further study is needed to determine the extent of the problem and the ways in 
which rising levels of concentration in hog packing are impacting producers, the 
available evidence – and the advanced levels of concentration – call for swift regulatory 
action to restore competitive conditions. 
 
Research should be farm-centered and should rely on detailed economic data, as 
Domina and Taylor did for poultry contracting. In the DOJ-USDA hearings, farmers have 
repeatedly voiced concerns about the lack of transparency in the marketplace and about 
unequal access to market information. Asymmetric information is a market failure that 
harms producers and creates market inefficiencies (Marsh and Brester 1999). The same 
issues plague the production of reliable research on this issue. Greater transparency is 
needed from packers, many of which are privately held companies and so disclose little 
information.  
 
Researchers and regulators must also address the methodological issues that 
contribute to the misinterpretation of results on buyer power. These include: 
 
• Whether hog buying markets are national or regional markets, where there may be a 
national sellers’ market but regional buyers’ markets. 
• The standards used to determine evidence of buyer vs. seller power, with the strong 
suggestion that tighter standards (e.g. HHI) should apply in buyer markets. 
• The ways in which apparent efficiency gains in seller markets, generally interpreted 
by DOJ as offsetting market power, may in fact derive from buyer power in these 
same concentrated markets. In other words, to what extent are lower consumer 
prices the product of buyer power forcing down producer prices? 
• The compounding of buyer power by an increasingly concentrated retail sector, 
such that retailers use their buyer power to squeeze suppliers’ margins and those 
suppliers use their own buyer power to lower prices paid to producers. 
• The interactions among different meat markets, and the implications of those 
interactions for the analysis of buyer power by packers of various types of meat. 
• The ways in which buyer power and the thinning of spot markets allows packers to 
influence prices through the timing of their own purchases as well as the sales of 
packer-owned animals. 
 
As for the policy implications of this review, there is a need to review both the 
DOJ approach to anti-trust enforcement in agricultural markets and USDA policies in 





important, and the voluminous testimony and comments gathered in the process should 
guide these departments in evaluating their policies and practices. Given how advanced 
the concentration of these markets has become during a period of lax anti-trust 
enforcement, it is important for DOJ to follow through on its promise to review past 
decisions, including the 2007 Smithfield-Premium Standard Farms merger. Stricter 
enforcement now would be welcome but it may do little to restore competitive balance to 
an industry already so concentrated. 
 
The USDA’s recently proposed GIPSA rule on “undue preferences” could address 
some of these issues. Mandated by the 2008 Farm Bill, the proposed rule addresses many 
predatory and anticompetitive practices in livestock and poultry markets. It is not within 
the purview of this paper to provide a comprehensive analysis of the proposed rule’s 
impacts on uncompetitive practices in hog markets, but it is worth noting that the 
proposed rule could help address: 
 
• contracts that do not cover required investments;  
• fairer contract arbitration;  
• the lack of contract transparency, by requiring the posting of sample contracts; 
• rights of producers to file suit against packers who engage in unfair practices 
without an undue burden of proof previously required by courts; 
• protection from packer retaliation;  
• price discrimination against group deliveries of animals;  
• the impact of packer-to-packer sales on market prices;  
• conflicts of interest when agents represent more than one packer.  
 
According to some advocates, the rule does not go far enough.  First, the proposed 
rule does nothing to address marketing agreements, forward contracts, or formula pricing, 
all of which are prevalent in hog markets. Second, it does not adequately address the anti-
competitive impacts of packer ownership of livestock.  
 
The renewed attention to these issues, from USDA and DOJ, is welcome and very 
much needed. Hopefully, the hearings and the proposed GIPSA rule generate a close 
examination of the existing evidence of buyer power and the methodologies used to 
evaluate it, and prompt action to restore competitive balance to livestock markets. 
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